Argentina privatized most public utilities during the 1990's but re-nationalized the main water company in 2006. We study beliefs about the benefits of the privatization of water services amongst low and middle income groups immediately after the 2006 nationalization. Negative opinions about the privatization prevail. These are particularly strong amongst households that did not benefit from the privatization and amongst households that were reminded of the government's negative views about the privatization. A person's beliefs of the benefits of the water privatization were almost 30% more negative (relative to other privatizations) if his/her household did not gain access to water after the privatization. Similarly, a person's view of the water privatization (relative to other privatizations) was 16% more negative if he/she was read a vignette with some of the negative statements about the water privatization that Argentina's President expressed during the nationalization process. Interestingly, the effect of the vignette on households that gained water is insignificant, while it is largest (and significant) amongst households that did not gain water during the privatization. This suggests that propaganda was persuasive when it had a basis on reality.
Introduction
A small but growing literature has emphasized the connection between beliefs and economic organization. For example, the amount of redistribution observed in the US and Europe, or the amount of market reform that we can expect in developing countries, appear to be connected with voter"s beliefs about actors (or elements) of the economic system. Two dimensions of these beliefs are particularly important: their variability and their accuracy.
Indeed, if these beliefs are fixed, perhaps because they are culturally/historically determined or because of people"s incentives to preserve and invest in "collective ideologies" do not vary, then the possibility of changing economic systems or of implementing long lasting market reforms will be limited. And if these beliefs can diverge from reality there is of course the possibility of large welfare losses. Indeed, one question that has confronted this research is the extent to which beliefs can be maintained in the face of available evidence to the contrary.
1 A natural question deals with both dimensions and asks the extent to which an agent (perhaps an "ideological entrepreneur") can persuade others of a particular point of view using old or fabricated data. In other words, we ask whether there are conditions under which propaganda is effective in changing people"s beliefs; and to what extent differences in reality affect the impact of propaganda.
To attempt an answer to this question, we study the formation of beliefs concerning the benefits of privatizing the main water company in Argentina during a period where the government made several attempts to persuade the public of its negative views on the private company, an effort that we call propaganda. Specifically, in June 2006 (three months after the nationalization) we implemented a survey to elicit views about the 1990"s market reforms in general and the water privatization in particular. It covered households living in middle and low income neighborhoods in the outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Two "treatments" were studied: the presence or not of firm investment and the presence or not of propaganda. Using detailed historical maps indicating which households had access to water services, we ensured that about half the usable addresses in the sample had gained water during the privatization while the other half remained without access at the time of the survey. We then reminded a (random) group of our sample of some negative statements made by President Kirchner concerning the lack of investment of the water company around the time of the nationalization (exactly as it was reported in the press). As a control, a statement that was made by the water company defending their record on investment was read to another sub-sample. The statement made by the President referred to a fact and was ostensibly untrue, and this was particularly evident to those that had gained water as a result of the company"s investment. Thus, we can evaluate the impact of propaganda across two sub-samples that had experienced different "realities".
Our approach exploits several features of this episode. First, the policy in question issue we focus on particularly salient to the public. Second, the privatized water company"s investment during the 1990"s brought water services to a large group of people. Since the ensuing water charges were significantly lower than what households were paying for substitute services, we have a group that is unambiguously and significantly better off in material terms with privatization. This group can be compared to the group that remained unconnected to the water services. Third, the firm that was the target of the attack was foreign owned, which increased the receptiveness of the public to the President"s attacks.
Fourth, during this episode the President gathered support for the nationalization by personally attacking on repeated opportunities the water company in the media and in political rallies for lack of investment. 2 Thus, we have one concrete example of a political agent trying to affect people"s beliefs about the privatized water service. This is helpful because, rather than designing a piece of information that we think might work as 2 A foreign investor that arguably did well economically in the privatizations of the 1990"s, which were often perceived to be quite corrupt, has several of the characteristics that Glaeser (2005) identifies as facilitating the acceptance of hate-creating stories by the public. De Marzo et al, (2003) show that the repeated nature of the attacks may help persuasion.
propaganda, and devising a setting in which there is a presumption that propaganda might be useful, we obtained the content and setting of our piece of propaganda from the real political "market". The repeated nature of the president"s public statements against the water company matches the episode with one theoretical dimension of propaganda campaigns. In other words, our empirical exercise uses an actual situation where propaganda was deemed useful (by an agent who has been successful in the political market) and one set of statements that were actually used as propaganda.
We find that the 1990"s market reforms are unpopular, receiving relatively low scores (on a 1-10 scale). The average score for the privatizations is 3.07, and it is somewhat higher amongst relatively poor households. We define Water Score Gap as the score for the water privatization minus the score for all the privatizations (see the appendix for data definitions).
We find that Water Score Gap is positively correlated with having gained water. The effect is large: those that gained water rate the water privatization over all the privatizations by 0.91 points, or a gain of almost 30% over the average score for all the privatizations. The effect of propaganda is also large: those that were reminded of the statements made by the President against the water company score it 0.49 points lower, or a drop of almost 16%.
There is no discernible effect of reading the statement made by the company. Interestingly, the negative effect of reading the president"s statement on beliefs is bigger (approximately double) when the household did not gain access to water during the 1990"s and is insignificant when it did. Our interpretation is that propaganda requires at least some basis in reality to have an effect (on people"s beliefs).
Our paper is connected to prior work on the formation of beliefs. 3 The possibility of persuasion was the focus of earlier work outside economics, although the effects found were often described as "minimal". 4 As described in a classic paper by Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 3 See, inter alia, Hochschild (1981) , Inglehart (1990 ), Shiller et al (1991 , Ladd and Bowman (1998), Schotter (1998) , Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) , Luttmer (2001) , Corneo and Gruner (2002), Fong (2001) , Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) , Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2007) , Alesina and Giiuliano (2008) , Landier et al (2008) and Aghion et al (2008) . See also Earle et al (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1994) for early work on support for privatization 4 See Nisbett and Ross (1980) for a classic account of how circumstances affect judgment. There is, of course, important work on persuasion and mass media in political psychology (see, for example, Milburn, 1991 , Zaller, 1992 , McGuire, 1985 , and Cialdini, 2001 . For a discussion and the relationship to the rest of political psychology, see Jost and Sidanius (2004) , who cite work by Mullen et al (1986) showing a positive correlation (1982) Katz and Feldman 1962; Patterson and McClure 1976; Sears and Chaffee 1978) ." Accordingly, research moved away from persuasion and towards the possibility of other effects of the media (for example, towards the study of agenda setting).
5
Work in economics on the subject focuses on the possibility of using information, perhaps strategically, to affect people"s beliefs. 6 Recent work takes a broader perspective. For example, Glaeser (2005) provides a model where citizens are persuaded to hold a negative point of view about particular groups. Citizens" willingness to be persuaded by hate-creating stories depends on the costs and benefits of acquiring information and on the existence of an out-group that is perceived to be influential politically but socially segregated. Theoretical work on the media, for example, describes which pieces of news will be more persuasive. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) argue that it will be those that agree with viewers prior beliefs, while Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) argue that reputation is important because it will be messages emitted by media outlets that share the viewer"s political inclination that will be judged to be more reliable. There is also previous work on the possibility that persuasion is easier to attain using categorical thinking and metaphors (as in Shleifer, 2006, and Lakoff, 1996) or when social networks are important (see, for example, De Marzo et al, 2003 and Murphy and Shleifer, 2004) . Note that if we detect persuasion when using a simple untrue fact, it is likely that less blatant forms of persuasion (which for example involve fewer patently untrue statements) can be employed successfully to affect people"s beliefs.
between the frequency of smiles by a TV news anchor when reporting on one of two presidential candidates (Reagan) and favorable viewer attitude towards Reagan. See, in particular, the review by Petty and Wegener (1998) , who remind us of a long experimental tradition to the study of attitude change in social psychology going back to the 1930"s, which points out that the effects depend in large part to situational factors (they cite the work of Knower, 1935) . 5 One example is Iyengar et al" (1982) itself, where they studied the effects of media exposure using random assignment in a lab setting. They presented one set of volunteers with a standard news program while another is shown an edited version with stories on other issues (using older material from the same station). They found that news coverage can affect evaluations of the importance of different issues (agenda setting). 6 See for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) , inter alia. More than 1000 but fewer than 2000, c) more than 2000 but fewer than 10,000, or d) more than 10,000? expected sign. Our paper is also an attempt to isolate the effect of persuasion as it links misinformation on a specific issue with an opinion about that issue.
Section 2 provides a brief historical description of the privatization and subsequent nationalization of the main water company in Argentina. It also describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our main results while section 4 concludes.
Historical Description, Data and Empirical Strategy

2.a. The Privatization and Re-Nationalization of the Water Service in Buenos Aires
Argentina undertook a comprehensive set of market reforms during the 1990"s that included a fiscal and monetary program that pegged the exchange rate and dramatically reduced inflation. It also featured a broad privatization program, which included the transfer of, amongst others, the national telephone company, the post, the national airline, oil, water and sanitation, electricity and gas sectors. The largest water company privatization was the concession in 1993 of the public company Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN), which provided service in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. It was awarded to Aguas Argentinas, a private consortium lead by the French company Lyonnaise des Eaux. The terms of the concession stipulated construction plans to expand the water network to 100% of the households and the sewage network to 95% of the households by the end of the 35-year concession. They also established service quality and waste treatment standards. The Buenos Aires water privatization did not imply significant price increases (figure 1 shows the evolution of prices). There was however an increases in the rate of collection of water bills and an eventual renegotiation that reduced the original price reductions.
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Economists have published studies suggesting that the privatization of the Buenos Aires water company increased investment in the sector improving efficiency and productivity (see Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo, 2000, Alcazar, Abdala and Shirley, 2002 and Galiani, 8 For a general discussion on the evolution of tariffs under privatization in Latin America see McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) , and for the Argentine case see Alcazar et al (2002), Gerchunoff, Greco and Bondorevsky (2003) , Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2003) , and Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) . Gertler and Schargrodsky, 2005) . Several case studies show large increases in water and sewage production, reductions in spillage, increases in tariff collections and significant service enhancements (summer water shortages almost disappeared, repair delays shortened, and water pressure and cleanliness improved). These service improvements came together with a reduction in almost half the number of employees. The employment reduction, together with the increase in coverage and production, resulted in large productivity increases. Investments were particularly important in terms of increased access to the network. More than 2,000,000 people gained access to the water service, and about 1,240,000 people obtained connections to the sewage network.
9
This network expansion resulted in three distinct groups within the population: one where people were already connected to the network before privatization, a second group with people that gained access after the privatization, and a third group that remained without access throughout. Of these groups the second was the one that made the biggest gains because their monthly expenditures on water fell significantly, besides the considerable convenience of the water and sewage connection.
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A crucial aspect, for our purposes, is the investments made by the company. We confirmed such investment, and the corresponding expansion in the network, through several sources:
the company, the reports made to the regulatory agency (ETOSS) and their subsequent statements to several legal entities (including congress), newspaper reports, changes in access to services reported in census data and other surveys (see Galiani et al., 2005) . We take this as evidence that in reality the company made significant investments. This notwithstanding, at the time of the crisis in 2002, more than 15 percent of the metropolitan population remained unconnected to the water network, while more than 40 percent still lacked access to the sewage network. A large fraction of the population that lacks access is located in the poorest neighborhoods of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
9 Dividends paid to the shareholders of Aguas Argentinas up to the economic crisis of 2002 amounted to 5% of equity. In that year no dividends were announced. There are obviously indirect ways of extracting surplus (e.g., transfer prices), but explicit accusations on this issue have not figured prominently in the press. 10 Galiani, Gonzalez-Rozada and Schargrodsky (2008) report significant reductions in household water expenditures associated to network expansions, as connected families are able to substitute piped water for more expensive and distant sources of water provision. and involving top political officials (the President, the key ministers as well as other officials), lasting many months. We do not have data on the costs of putting together such a generalized campaign to affect people"s beliefs but we suspect it can be quite large. 
2.b. Data Description
We administered a survey in June 2006 to 560 households that had been living in the same house (not apartment buildings) since before 1993. The survey used random replacement and covered households in middle-low and low income neighborhoods in the outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina. An important feature of our design is that, using detailed historical maps of water service access, we ensured that about half the sample gained water during the privatization while the other half remained without access throughout the 1990"s until the 2006 nationalization and up until our survey. Our questionnaire confirmed water access status. In the survey we elicited beliefs about the benefits of several market reforms that took place during the 1990"s. Tables 1a and 1b present a basic description of the data.
Opinions about the market reforms in our sample are quite negative, with an overall score of 3.75 out of ten (although it should be noted that our sample excludes the top half of the income distribution where more support is to be expected). Of course these numbers do not have a natural interpretation, but as a mild anchor we note that in the educational system in Argentina a 4 is an undistinguished note (although enough to pass some exams in secondary school and most in university).
In order to present our study of the effect of propaganda, we discuss two "treatments", namely the effect of firm investments on the beliefs about the benefits of the water privatizations, and the effect of government propaganda on the same outcome. Table 1a provides the scores for the sub-sample that gained water and the sub-sample that remained without water. It reveals that the No Water sub sample gives a higher score to the reforms of the 1990"s (4.06 versus 3.44) and the privatizations (3.35 versus 2.79), but a lower score to the water privatization (3.35 versus 3.82). Similarly, in Table 1b the sample is split into a group that received the government propaganda treatment, a second group that received the information provided by the company, and a control group. The group that was read the government statement about the water company gives a somewhat lower score to the water privatization (3.33) than the group that was read the company statement (3.68) or the control group (3.59).
Obtaining access to the water network for a family living in a certain location is not under its control. As explained above, the concession terms stipulated a set of construction plans that were needed in order to expand the water network to 100% of the households, one of the objectives of the 35-year concession. These expansion plans explicitly pre-defined the timing of arrival of the water network to each area (see Aguas Argentinas, 2001 ). Although exogenous, failure to receive water is correlated with location and, thus, potentially with income and other factors that might be connected to ideological position in this setting.
Therefore, simply comparing the score given to the water privatization across sub-samples will give us a biased view of the extent of support for privatization. 13 It is therefore of interest to compare the distribution of household characteristics amongst our respondents. Tables 2a and 2b present the raw data. Table 2a focuses on the characteristics of households that gained water during the privatization. In our sample, the data suggests that 84% of head of households without access to water are classified as unskilled, while only 77% of those with access to water are unskilled. The difference is statistically significant. The head of households without water also appear to be younger (5 years on average), poorer (or at least with lower scores on the Socioeconomic Index) and are more likely to be the respondents to the survey, possibly because more of them do not have steady jobs. All of these differences are statistically significant. In brief, Table 2a suggests that the two groups (those that gained water and those that remained without water) are different on several dimensions that we could measure.
There is no reason to believe that all the dimensions over which these two groups differ are measurable, so comparing means across the two groups will remain unconvincing.
Fortunately, one approach that allows us to get around the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is to differentiate the data by subtracting the score for other privatizations from the score given to the privatization of water (Water Score Gap). These differentiated scores are uncorrelated to all the observables that we can measure, as will become clear later on (from the insignificant coefficients on these observables in a Water Score Gap regression in Table 3 ). Accordingly, a reasonable assumption is that other dimensions that we did not measure are also uncorrelated with the gap.
The second treatment concerns government propaganda. This was implemented through the use of vignettes, read to the respondents during the interview, before the question on water privatization but after the questions on overall reforms and privatizations. Three groups equal in size were randomly defined: the sub-sample being read a "President Vignette", the sub-sample being read a "Firm Vignette", and a control group. We collected all newspaper reports that referred to the nationalization of the water company. The main argument for nationalization, as stated by the government, was the firm"s failure to invest to expand the coverage and improve water quality. This was repeated in several occasions. 14 Accordingly, we selected a statement related to the firm"s investment from the main speech by the main actor in the pro nationalization camp (the President). For the firm vignette, we simply collected the firm"s statement reacting to this accusation. Table 2b presents the raw data for the three relevant groups. The first column presents the means for the group that was not read any of the two vignettes. It shows that 83% of the control group was classified as unskilled. The second column shows the difference with the group read the President vignette and the third column shows that the result of a t-test suggests that the difference is not statistically significant. Column 4 presents the difference between the mean for the control group and the mean for the sub-sample being read the firm vignette. The last column in Table 2b (column five) shows that a t-test of this difference is also not significant. The only variable where there is a statistically significant difference between the control group and one of the treatment groups was age, where those reminded of the firm propaganda were five years younger than the control group. Note that those reminded of the President"s views are 2 years younger than the control group (t-statistic is only 1.4), so it seems that it is the control group which seems to have abnormally high age.
Given that it is in only one attribute, and that the absolute size of the difference seems small, we conclude that the randomization of the "propaganda" treatment was reasonably successful.
2.c. Empirical Strategy
We estimate a regression of the form Whenever President Vignette i is included in a regression, we also include Firm Vignette i which is the piece of information released by the company during these attacks (they are defined in the appendix; note that these vignettes are read to different sub-samples). This strategy helps by providing a benchmark of how information is affecting beliefs.
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While the construction of the variable Gained Water was relatively straightforward once we obtained the maps of the city detailing the areas where there had been increases in water access, the empirical approach designed to capture the effect of propaganda was somewhat more challenging. We selected one of the statements made by the President, and constructed a vignette which added a short introduction explaining the circumstance in which the statement was made. Given that it is debatable what constitutes propaganda and what does not, we used an actual statement made by President Kirchner in his attempt to affect people"s beliefs about the benefits of having privatized the water service. One characteristic of the statement is that it is obviously inaccurate (the facts reported are demonstrably untrue). A second characteristic is that it is set in the real political "market", an actual situation where propaganda was deemed useful (by an agent who has been successful in that market). Our hypothesis is that the short intervention will remind participants of a worldview that had been extensively communicated to them in the media and that they might find
15 It also provides evidence on the standard tendency to agree with the interviewer.
plausible. The brevity of the intervention would presumably bias the results against finding an effect of propaganda.
16
This statement was read during the interviews by the members of the survey company to one third of the respondents, after an introduction that explained that the investigation was carried by university professors for academic purposes and was not financed by the government, any government organization or a private company. After a small initial set of questions, the interviewer said "Before continuing we want to read to you a piece of information recently appeared in the newspapers". Then the interviewer read: The interviewer then said, "returning to the survey, how would you evaluate…". We constructed President Vignette, a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement and zero otherwise. In order to benchmark any potential tendency of the respondents to bias their answers to agree with the interviewer, we also provided a second vignette on this topic to another third of our sample. This time it reported what the company had said in response to the attacks of the president (Firm Vignette). See the appendix for all data definitions.
One difficulty with this empirical strategy is that while one could potentially derive the cost to the company of affecting reality (by dividing the total investment costs to the company by the number of households connected to the water service), it is harder to put a price tag on the propaganda campaign. This means that we do not provide a precise comparative analysis of the costs of changing beliefs through a propaganda campaign versus an investment campaign (reality). Instead, we focus on whether a political entrepreneur can change people"s beliefs through a large propaganda campaign (containing patently untrue statements). And, to what extent differences in "reality" affect the impact of propaganda. Table 3 presents the basic estimates for the effect of investment on views about privatization. The left hand side variable in column (1) is Water Score Gap, the difference between the score given to the water privatizations and the score given to all the privatizations, while the main right hand side variable is Gained Water, a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained water and sanitation during the privatization. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 include personal characteristics and municipality dummies, obtaining very similar results. 17 The coefficients on personal characteristics are insignificant, confirming the benefit of employing the difference between scores as our dependent variable (instead of just the score for the water privatization; see also Table 2a ).
Results
18, 19
One way to gauge the size of the effect is to note that the average score given to privatizations in general is 3.07, so that using the coefficient from column (1) we note that having received the benefit of a particular privatization (gained water) improves the score for the relevant privatization by almost 30% (0.91/3.07). An alternative benchmark is the score given to the water privatization by those that did not receive water. The average score it receives in this group is 3.35, so that receiving the benefits of firm investment (having gained water) improves the score just over 27%. 17 Although about only half of municipalities present within-municipality variability in Gained Water. 18 The results of these regressions are qualitatively similar if we use Score Water Privatization as the dependent variable (instead of Water Score Gap). There are two main differences: some of the coefficients on the personal characteristics for which we have data are significant on some specifications; and the absolute size of the coefficient on the variable Gained Water changes across specifications. 19 When data on a control is missing, we impute a zero and then use dummy variables to indicate this. This choice of using dummies to indicate missing observations for the controls, rather than reducing the sample when we do not have data on a particular personal characteristic of a respondent, reflects the fact that once we focus on Water Score Gap, personal characteristics are no longer playing an important role. None of the results in this or in the other tables are affected if we instead drop those observations and reduce the sample. Table 4 introduces the effect of propaganda. While the coefficient on Gained Water is unchanged, the coefficient on President Vignette is negative and significant at the 10% level in columns (1) and (2) and at the 5% level in column (3). The size of the effect is large: relative to the score that the water privatization receives by those that are not read any vignette, exposure to the government propaganda reduces the score by almost 16% (0.49/3.07). The effect of Firm Vignette is close to zero and statistically insignificant. 20 This suggests that the channel through which President Vignette affects beliefs is persuasion rather than the provision of information. suggesting that the effect of propaganda is particularly strong on those that did not have first-hand experience of the firm"s investment. The large size of the effect suggests the following calculation: a firm that invests to provide water access to a household gains almost as much support by this action as it gains from ensuring that the household is not exposed to the propaganda of the political entrepreneur. Given our empirical design, we are unable to provide an estimate of how long lasting is this effect of exposure to propaganda. we are unable to detect them with our approach.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the effect of a large propaganda campaign by the government in the formation of beliefs about the benefits of water privatization in Argentina. We are concerned with two questions: Can a political entrepreneur persuade others of his/her views or are beliefs only affected by data learned through direct observation? And to what extent differences in "reality" affect the impact of propaganda?
We approach the issue by conducting a survey after the government nationalized the water company in 2006 following a propaganda campaign in the media where it repeatedly pointed out the shortcomings of privatizing public utilities as well as criticize other market oriented policies taken during the 1990"s by a previous government. We implement our test of propaganda by reading a sub-sample of subjects a negative statement about the water company made by the government as part of its campaign rallying support for the nationalization. The statement alleged a total lack of investment on the part of the company and was demonstrably untrue. We then asked respondents their views about the benefits of privatizations. In order to get variation in "reality" we used city maps of water access to ensure that our sample contained two groups: one that gained access to water after the water company was privatized in 1993 and another group that never received access.
A summary of the results is as follows: while negative opinions about the privatizations prevail, these are particularly strong amongst households that did not benefit from the privatization and amongst households that were reminded of the government"s views about the privatization. A person"s beliefs of the benefits of the water privatization (relative to other privatizations) were almost 30% more negative if his/her household did not gain access to water after the privatization. Similarly, a person"s view of the water privatization (relative to other privatizations) was 16% more negative if he/she was read a vignette with some of the negative statements about the water privatization that Argentina"s President expressed during the re-nationalization process. Perhaps the most interesting result is that the effect of the vignette is large and significant amongst households that did not gain water during the privatization while it is insignificant amongst those that gained access.
The interpretation of our results is straightforward. First, we find that propaganda can be effective in changing people"s views. By design, our estimates reflect the role of persuasion rather than other influences (like agenda setting) because the piece of propaganda and the respondent"s beliefs concern the same specific issue (whereas in studies focusing on how propaganda changes voting the estimates could reflect either channel). Second, we find that the effectiveness of propaganda depends on "reality": people who have first-hand experience that contradicts the statements made by the President are unaffected by them. Those that do not have such experience are particularly susceptible to be affected by propaganda. This is consistent with models of persuasion predicting that individuals who have cheaper access to facts will be harder to persuade. More broadly, our results suggest heterogeneity in individual experiences (under privatization) allows political entrepreneurs the possibility of changing the beliefs on one group through propaganda.
Our study has limitations. One that appears important is that we do not know how long these propaganda effects last. 22 Another problem is that even though having gained access to water improved people"s opinion about the water privatization, it is still true that they were still quite negative amongst this group of middle and low income households. It is extremely unlikely that these would have gained access had the privatization not occurred (judging from the performance of the water company before the privatization or since the renationalization). 23 Thus, either people care about other aspects of the privatization beyond the purely material benefits emphasized by economists, or their views may only partially be affected by their experiences. For example, the collapse of the macroeconomic program (which pegged the exchange rate) that was implemented together with the privatizations may be weighing on respondents minds, although such bundling of opinions does not occur naturally in rational models of belief formation. 22 The first in a series of pamphlets produced under Josef Goebbels" Reichspropaganda-Abteilung, the propaganda section of the Nazi Party, included a text (by G. Stark) explaining the connection between propaganda and beliefs: "Propaganda is by no means simply commercial advertising applied to the political, or spiritual arena. They seek only momentary effect, whereas political propaganda seeks the systematic enlightenment necessary to win supporters to a worldview." from the German Propaganda Archive, accessed online on July 1 st , 2008. 23 Stokes (2001) The President said: "I find it hard to believe how spoiled these companies have become, who sit and negotiate asking 60% increases in water. "No way, Jose", we will allow them a raise! (Minga que les vamos a aumentar!). First, let them provide water to the people", Kirchner said. "Come to work, to invest and generate jobs, don"t just come seeking profits"
July 28, 2005: Clarin newspaper During a speech at the Government House, the President said: "When one goes visiting different places, even though we have made lot of progress, how many people do not have access to water". "To tell the truth", he added, "one is moved that so close to the obelisk and the General Paz we can still find so many people that still cannot access drinkable water". Kirchner then added that "the water concession companies should keep this type of thing very present". And he then moved to a more menacing tone "We are not interested in having concession companies that do not fulfill services to the people. We want them to fulfill the services to the people and they will have to fulfill because we are going to take all the actions that are necessary and the roads that are necessary". Kirchner, on Tuesday, during a political rally in Mar de Ajo, attacked hard the water concession company, whose European shareholders (Suez, Aguas de Barcelona, Anglian and Vivendi) announced their intention to cancel the concession contract. "There are companies, like Aguas Argentinas, that should acknowledge that what they did to us is shameful, because they have taken five thousand million dollars and did not even build two pipes" said the president.
February 22, 2006: La Nación newspaper During an act in Ezeiza, Kirchner questioned the work of the company, controlled by the French group Suez, which at present is looking for a buyer that would take over the water concession contract, "How could it be that there are districts in Argentina, such as the case of La Matanza, where only 20 percent of the population has water?", the president asked himself. "That is what that company did, Aguas Argentinas, that is beating around the bush so much", he added in reference to Suez"s unresolved exit.
March 22, 2006: La Nación newspaper Minister De Vido accused Aguas Argentinas of not having fulfilled with the agreed plan for works on the expansion and improvement of the service, and of "endangering the health of the population". Kirchner rated the service that was provided by the company as "terrible", and assured that the cancellation of the contract brought an end to "an insult and an injustice" and that "water will once again be a social good". He also attacked the executives directly. "They have been in Argentina for 15 years, they took away hundreds of millions of dollars in profits and we have to beg to get a drop of water. Enough, now, we the Argentines, we will construct destiny as it should be done", he proclaimed. "Those that exploited the company earned, but water did not reach the Argentines of the outskirts". Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). The dependent variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the privatization. Omitted category is No Water. In Columns (2) and (3) we impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). The dependent variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the privatization. Government (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government (firm) vignette. Individual controls include skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household. Omitted category is No Water. In Columns (2) and (3) we impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis), which includes individual controls and municipality fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1a-3a) is Telephones Score Gap, the score given to the telephone privatization minus the score given to all privatizations, while in columns (1b-3b) it is Oil Score Gap, the score given to the privatization of the national oil company minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government (firm) vignette. Individual controls include skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household. Omitted category is No Water. We impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). All include municipality fixed effects and individual controls (skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household). The dependent variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government (firm) vignette. High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent"s socioeconomic score index was over the median. Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that those that put in effort end up much better or considerably better than those who do not put in effort (and zero if the think slightly better or the same). Voted Menem is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted for Carlos Menem in the 1989 presidential election. Omitted category is the group that was not read any vignette. We impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). All include municipality fixed effects and individual controls (skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household). The dependent variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government (firm) vignette. High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent"s socioeconomic score index was over the median. Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that those that put in effort end up much better or considerably better than those who do not put in effort (and zero if they report slightly better or the same). Voted Menem is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted for Carlos Menem in the 1989 presidential election. Omitted category is No Water. We impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. Gained Water: A dummy equal to 1 if the household gained connection to the water service after the 1993 privatization (and zero otherwise).
Description of the Variables
No Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was not read any statements (and zero otherwise).
President Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement below (and zero otherwise):
Information that recently appeared in the newspapers discusses serious problems in the quality of water in Lomas de Zamora.
On March 9, 2006, President Kirchner cancelled by decree the contract of Aguas Argentinas. In its decision the government alleged problems with the quality of service as the main reason to renationalize the company. On repeated occasions, President Kirchner has criticized the company for lack of compliance of the terms of the concession contract and, more generally, for their performance since privatization.
Recently, in a political rally in Mar de Ajo, he stated:
"There are companies, like Aguas Argentinas, that should acknowledge that what they did to us is shameful, because they have taken five thousand million dollars and did not even built two pipes"
Firm Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement below (and zero otherwise):
The company Aguas Argentinas, which was responsible for water services in the Greater Buenos Aires area, has published information regarding the amount of investment made since privatization in 1993. These investments have allowed the company to:
Increase the population with access to drinkable water by 2 million people (from 5.5 million to 7.5 million between 1993 and 2004) Increase the population with access to sewage and sanitation services by 1.2 million people (from 4.7 million to 5.9 million between 1993 and 2004) Increase the pressure in the water network, reduce shortage cuts during summer and improve water muddiness.
Improve other aspects of water quality, although recently in some areas served by Aguas Argentinas high levels of nitrates have been found -for example in Lomas de Zamora
The company also explained that the average water charge for residential customers of 25,81 pesos bimonthly, equivalent to 43 cents per day, is one of the lowest in Latin America. However, since the devaluation of the peso and the end of Convertibility in January 2002, the company has been requesting an increase in the tariff. The lack of agreement with the government over this issue has ended with the re-nationalization of the company.
Unskilled (=1):
A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is unskilled (and zero otherwise). The unskilled are those reporting an education level below high school completed.
Semi-Skilled (=1):
A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is semi-skilled (and zero otherwise). The semi-skilled are those reporting completed high school, completed tertiary and incomplete tertiary-university education.
Age: The age (in years) of the household head.
Socioeconomic Index Score:
The score for the socioeconomic index of the household, as described in Argentine Marketing Association (1998) .
HH is Respondent (=1):
A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is the person responding the survey (and zero otherwise). High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent"s socioeconomic score index was over the median (and zero otherwise).
Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question "In general, do you believe that people who make an effort working end up, 1) much better than those who did not put in effort, 2) quite a bit better off, 3) a bit better off or 4) just about the same as those that did not put in an effort?", was either 1) or 2) and zero if the answer was 3) or 4).
Voted Menem is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent says that s/he voted for Carlos Menem, the president who implemented the market reforms of the 1990"s, in the 1989 presidential election (and zero otherwise).
